The conflict by dint of pop Ali?s reign among himself and Muawiya was purportedly due to his reluctance and decision non to find and visit Uthman?s killers, and then regarded as an indirect accomplice in the murder. This seemed to be fitted intellect for Muawiya not to pay committedness to him, as it was his indebtedness as an Arab chieftain to avenge Uthman?s finish . that, historians such(prenominal) as Kennedy, tend to agree with the Shia view, ?treating this guide as a fallible pretext for his actions.? The Shia especially tends to get down and humiliate Muawiya, vilifying him for his op side to Ali out of sheer demand for agent and spot . stock- even so Shia and Sunni historians tend to be biased on their views of Muawiya, thus diminishes their reliability and proper judgement on his geek and rule. Sources and historic companionship on his life and c beer are actually meager and of his inner motives and purposes we know even less. common consensus am ong historians, although a simplistic one, states that the master(prenominal) reason behind Muawiya?s rebellion once mo light Ali was payment for Uthman. While it may be comprehend as up flop that, only a few defecate managed to delve deeper into the cardinal reasons behind Muawiya?s actions. any(prenominal) traditionists such as al-Jurjani, Baladhuri and Awana feel a totally different outlook, eliminating Muawiya and economiseing that Amr b. al-As was the one who initiated and organized the storm and combats against Ali in Syria. Amr was a cheat political genius, who was as soundly as behind the arbitration that deposed Ali, and thus possible that he was the brains behind Muawiya. Other views re-examine the revolt against Uthman. some(prenominal) reports impeach Muawiya of detective work the imminent catastrophe and exploiting it for his own self-serving ends and ?began scheming and desire Uthman?s killing so as to succeed him as caliph? while new(prenomina l)wises showed him in a favourable unaffixe! d ? removeing he came to Uthman?s appeals as short as he solidised how serious the situation was only was unspoilt too ripe. accord to Madelung, ?Uthman had meant small-minded to him; he had through nothing to aid him and mat up no personal liability to search revenge.? From this evidence and Muawiya?s deliberate delay for Uthman?s appeals for help, it is thus conflicting with his reason for opposing Ali - blood retaliation; this was in fact a great ?political good? for his own secular ambitions and just a way to meet his Umayyad kinsmen who look to him for leadership and to obviate alienation. This claim is further back up since his launch for vengeance in Syria was only by and by the conflict of the Camel, sextette months or more afterwards Uthman?s murder. coincidently after the first civil war, which further stained Ali?s emblem as caliph, Muawiya needed that a Shura be set up for the purpose of nominating an untarnished caliph. If he was so keen to l ook for revenge, why did he wait that long? Instead, the difficult localization he was in had spurred him into action. Ali had dismissed most of the provincial governors defecate by his predecessor to reward his behaveers for their services however, Muawiya on the other hand had built a strong local big businessman base in Syria and ref utilise ?to be dismissed with ease or to stand by and see Uthman?s work undone.? at one time Ali?s presence in Iraq and Qays b. Sads parlous control of Egypt expose him and Syria to potential attack from two fronts. compensate if Muawiya had accepted the nemesis of allegiance to Ali, Ali would have certainly used his authority to contract him from his position as governor of Syria; so might as well not give his allegiance and use the demand for blood vengeance as a tool to berate rebellion against Ali and secure his h gray-haired on Syria. Thus he stepped up his propaganda against Ali and hoped to draw the governor of Egypt to his sid e, by threats and promises. His ratiocination to c! arry on in great force out alternatively then genuinely desire revenge for Uthman reflects his self-loving character and his unlawful tactics against Ali swear his position as one of personal gain. Keeping to that point, ?It has been suggested that the competitor amidst Ali and Muawiya entailed some decimal point of territorial competition between Iraq and Syria.? This suggestion was supported by Hitti, stating ?The issue however, was more than a personal one; it transcended individualistic and even family affairs. The real incredulity was whether Kufa or Damascus, Iraq or Syria, should be supreme in Islamic affairs.? A victory for Muawiya?s army would mean Syrian domination over the rest of the empire, supporting his claim for caliphate and again another example of his lust for power. Some historians state the real aim of Muawiyah was to create difficulties in the way of Ali in exhibition to pave the way for the transpose of power to the Umayyads. The conflict betwe en Ali and Muawiyah was really the recurrence of the old rivalry between the Hashimites and the Umayyads, who ?believed that the caliphate had through Uthman be get under ones skin ?their property?.? until now this aim was unlikely the main reason of conflict tho alternatively served as an bonus for the members of each clan to fight. over again power always seems to be the motive; the new Arab polish the Prophet had strived for is gradually retroversion back to their old Bedouin ways. other reason for Muawiya?s resistivity against Ali was the effects it would have if he had paid allegiance. As stated by Humphreys: ?the acknowledgment that Ali had come to power in a rightful manner, that there were no other legitimate claimants for the station of caliph?? Muawiya could not commit for these effects to take curry, as he will often lose all his power and status. In fact, Ali?s involution to caliph lacked legitimacy. Although his close family relationship with the Prop het and merits for Islam seemed enough for his claim,! ?He was not chosen by a Shura, which Umar had stipulated as a condition for valid succession.? but doubts surround whether his attitude towards Uthman?s murder permit him to fill the caliphate. Despite that, throughout the contest of the Camel and the Battle of Siffin, Muawiya had ?make no claims of his own? until later on, concentrating first of all on his position as governor of Syria and waiting until Ali compromised himself by his conduct before interfere in the course of events . Muawiya had no claim or the support needed to aspire for the caliphate and his status as a late and ?convenient? convert without premature merit in Islam did not help him. The disintegration of Ali?s caliphate was then ascribed to ?Kharijite opposition rather to his activities, which was sacredly unlawful? although he was the one who started the chain reaction which led to these events. His vengeance for Uthman and determination to admit his governorship led to the Battle of Siffin, whic h led to the arbitration, which ill-definedened Ali?s position and then Muawiya ?openly asserted his claims to the caliphate.? All the right pieces had suitably fell into place to strengthen his claim to the caliphate and kudos has to be given to him for his political shrewdness, moderation and self-control. There is little historic evidence to subsume Muawiya with the deaths of Hassan and Husayn. Although Muawiya had made a financial agreement with Hassan not to claim his caliphate, people today, mainly Shia, still implicate him with his death, claiming that he was ? possibly envenomed because of some harem intrigue.? Some early Arab historians believe that Muawiya made many plans and arrangements to kill Hassan . It was give tongue to that he secretly contacted Hassan?s wife Ja?da bint al-Ash?arh ibn Qays and instigated her to poison her husband, promising gold and mating to Yazid in return . However it is unlikely that Muawiya would benefit in any way by killing Hassan. Hassan proved to be no threat to his caliphate and ha! d no political involvement at all. Because of the lack of substantial evidence, it is rubber eraser to conclude that Hassan?s death was not connected to Muawiya?s personal motives against Ali. The same could be said for Husayn?s death; Muawiya had already passed absent and the focus has shifted to his son, Yazid I. Some weak sources claim that Muawiya had promised Husayn the Caliphate after his death.
Here, it can only be assumed that he cherished to keep the power in his family and the Umayyads, and it?s possible that there might still be some personal blood feud against Ali, thus he went back on his word and se t up the entrée of his son, Yazid I and indirectly played a give out in Husayn?s death. Muawiya?s nomination of Yazid caused a stir in the Muslim community, those opposing the plan, quickly ? incriminate Muawiya of attempting to set up a hereditary monarchy.? It also brought earnest speculation of Muawiya?s Islamic dedicate and its ideals. However, he likely realised the flaws of a democratic caliphate and sensed that a monarchy would be the best way forward for the Muslims, considering the fact that the Arabs supported the mood during the issue of succession of the Prophet in the case of Ali. Armstrong though states that he ?de helping from Arab traditions in order to secure the succession.? Weiss and deoxyguanosine monophosphate rebuke this statement, believing that ?even in this matter Muawiya showed deference to Arab sensitivities. Rather than imposing the dynastic principle upon tribal leaders, he secured from them an oath of allegiance for his son, thu s basing the succession upon their consent rather tha! n upon any legitimate right of his household.? The principle of succession by election was thereby honored, while the caliphate actually passed from father to son. Muawiya had ensnare a loophole though this system and consequently created a pseudo for a de facto dynasty. But considering Yazid?s character, ?an absolute playboy? , the apparitional quality of the caliph has taken a back foundation to the politics, therefore also reflecting Muawiya?s religious grounding and proves that his intentions were to keep the Umayyads in power. Muawiya?s actions throughout his career demonstrate that ?his virtues were those of the prideful politician, not of the brilliant general or the religious leader.? more or less historians, such as Kennedy, Armstrong, and Peterson etc. agree that Muawiya was problematic in religious context, stating that he is far from ideal and ? conscientiously moving? . According to Humphreys, ?In formal piety and personal conduct, he was acceptable enou gh (at least he provoked no public scandal) but he was never regarded as religiously learned or even thoughtful and engaged, beyond a superficial level. He believed in God and was publicly coiffure in his observances but no more.? His lack of Islamic put could be confirmed in his actions and decisions. Religiously unlawful activities and stunner methods of gaining power and status against Ali establish his disregard and failure to deem to simple Islamic principles, ideals, the Quran and Hadith. In conclusion, although Muawiya was a come in of the conflicts and anxieties that afflicted the Ummah, he is decisive political figure in the history of Islam. Muawiya was ?literally the only man with political and soldiers resources available to restore unity? , despite lacking a religious moral ground. Even though he restored peace, he had deliberately provoked and been a major protagonist in the civil war that disunited them in the first place. Whilst historical evidence on his personal thoughts and intentions are not solid, it i! s manifest though that his ascension to caliph and power was ultimately part due to his own machinations. Bibliography:1.Armstrong, Karen, Islam: A Short muniment, Phoenix Press, London, 20022.Hawting, G. R., The measuring of al-Tabari Volume XVII The First Civil War, New York Press, USA, 19963.Hitti, Phillip K., fib of the Arabs, Macmillan, New York, 20024.Humphreys, Stephen R., Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan ? From Arabia to Empire, Oneworld Pubns Ltd, 20065.Kennedy, Hugh, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, Pearson Education Limited, Great Britain, 20046.Madelung, Wilferd, The victorious over to Muhammad ? A Study of early Caliphate7.Petersen, Erling Ladewig, Ali and Muawiya in Early Arabic Tradition, Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 19648.Weiss, Bernard G. and Green, Arnold H., A Survey of Arab history, Cairo, Cairo Press, Amer. Univ., 1990 i must say, this essay is very good overall. Ha s many sources to back up the author and also has looked at the situation from both sides. If you want to get a full essay, order it on our website:
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